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Australia has an open economy that is heavily dependent on 
trade for its wellbeing. Well formulated evidence based trade 
policy therefore matters greatly, as does the form and content of 
these economic agreements (Miankhel et al. 2014). 
Past trade policy practice has been focussed on consultations 
with industry as a precursor to negotiations, with the aim of 
rectifying market access issues. Today’s trade treaties go far 
beyond negotiations about actual trade (Quiggin 2015). They 
also tackle a wide range of domestic policy issues. 
These broader ‘economic partnership’ or ‘comprehensive trade’ 
agreements deal as much, if not more, in regulatory politics as 
in traditional trade policy. Consequently they affect many non-
trading businesses and many segments of the wider community. 
This article draws on three different perspectives to suggest 
that consultations on these new generation deals need to be 
broader and more robust. Input from at least three major sectors 
of society is essential to identify Australia’s priority ‘demands’ 
in a negotiation, and those areas of domestic activity that are 
non-negotiable. 
Here we suggest a process for consultation with business, 
consumers and various levels of government that would 
enhance outcomes. We suggest that the national interest would 
be better identified in a process that is separate from any 
particular prospective trade deal (and its politically imposed time 
constraints) and which fully accounts for our domestic settings. 
The objective of these agreements should be the maximum 
benefit to the national interest, rather than achieving specific 
export successes. Such market entry issues create benefits 
for only selected businesses. A focus on a broader agenda of 
prioritised domestic reform would result in a stronger increase 
in national welfare.
Business
Australian trade negotiators have enjoyed a long period of 
substantial autonomy over the development of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. Low levels of public interest in trade 
policy and a multi-stakeholder business environment have 
traditionally allowed negotiators to pick and choose arguments 
in support of selective notions of the national interest (Morin & 
Duchesne 2013). 
In an increasingly globalised world, Australian consumers are 
exposed to the realities of transnational supply chains, and 
business directly experiences the fiscal realities of cross-border 
influence via customer behaviour. In this context a focus on 
narrow sectional interests in determining the national interest is 
now facing criticism.
If Australian trade agreements are to realise their ambitious 
economic outcomes, business must be more directly involved 
in their negotiation. The grandiose economic promises made 
to business by government create expectations in the business 
community of tangible negotiating positions that support actual 
business performance. 
The strong case for improved business consultation in the 
development of Australia’s trade negotiating stances is made 
clear by a series of regional industry surveys, released in late 
2014. These demonstrate suboptimal business use of trade 
agreements, and undermine ambitious claims about their 
economic potential. 
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) surveyed senior executives 
from 800 companies across eight economies in the Asia-Pacific 
region. It found that the average usage rate by business of the 
more than 50 trade agreements covering those economies 
amounted to 26%. In Australia, trade agreement usage by 
business fell below this average, at just 19%.
Another survey of 1000 Australian businesses by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Australia, conducted in 2014 (the 
same year Australia concluded agreements with Korea, Japan 
and China) found that only 9% of Australian businesses are 
currently operating in Asia. The vast majority of businesses 
surveyed (65%) have absolutely no intention of commencing 
operations in Asia in the next two to three years.
Contemporary surveys of business demonstrate a national 
trading reality that fails to correspond to the selective notion 
of the national interest recently pursued by Australian trade 
negotiators. There is a strong case for improved consultations 
with business towards a better focussed negotiating agenda.
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new. The program of economic cooperation between Australia 
and New Zealand since 1983 and the 2003 Singapore-Australian 
Free Trade Agreement are two examples where extensive 
cooperation between the Commonwealth and states and 
territories was required. In the case of mutual recognition of goods 
and occupations with New Zealand, the international agreement 
was preceded by a similar commitment among the states and 
territories. Resolving outstanding issues has been a long-haul 
process in train since the mid-1990s. All evidence suggests that 
the internal reforms were every bit as difficult as the international 
commitment. States and territories have necessarily been heavily 
involved. 
If trade agreements elsewhere are any indication, future deals will 
rely on political cooperation and commitment from Australian states 
and territories, and perhaps even local government. The recently 
completed Comprehensive Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) 
between Canada and the European Union (EU) provides some 
clues. For example it includes broad coverage on government 
procurement at federal, provincial and territory levels inside both 
Canada and the EU member states. Canadian provinces were 
represented during the relevant negotiations, and have been vocal 
in evaluating the deal after its signing. Like Australia, Canada had 
in place some basic institutional mechanisms for trade policy 
consultations inside the federation. These arrangements were 
tested, and arguably found wanting, during the protracted CETA 
negotiations (Fafard and Leblond, 2013). The real test of provincial 
commitment – CETA’s implementation – is still to come. 
The Commonwealth-State Standing Committee on Treaties1 is 
one possible avenue for enhanced cooperation among Australian 
governments. However the case can be made for an effective 
Trade Minister’s Council, consisting of trade (or equivalent) 
ministers from each jurisdiction. Along with other COAG Councils 
this Council has been regularly disbanded and re-established. In 
its latest iteration it is named the Trade and Investment Ministers’ 
Council and it met in February and September 2014. 
Following recent reforms to the system of the COAG Councils, 
the trade ministers will no longer meet under the auspices of 
COAG but on an ad hoc basis. This is unfortunate, since the 
complex consultations and negotiations that are likely to be 
required for coming trade treaties would have been well served by 
the institutional arrangements (voting procedures, a functioning 
secretariat) which underpin COAG and its Councils. Further, high 
level political agreement can be instrumental in pushing forward 
the internal work across the federation that may be required to 
agree and implement the trade deals. 
What can be done?  
The task ahead of Australian negotiators is now a daunting one. 
Trade policy is increasingly politicised, and the changing nature 
of the agreements makes the task even greater. All evidence 
suggests that economic integration policy has the potential to 
be highly contentious: consider the profile and politics of the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement and the current 
TPP negotiations. 
We suggest that broader consultation is required to meet current 
needs. Business is consulted prior to trade negotiations, but 
usage rates suggest that the agreements are not always meeting 
industry needs. There are no consultations to determine where 
input costs are high and therefore where domestic concessions 
would result in national gains. Consumers have scant input into 
a process which will increasingly impact them directly. Citizens 
have no say in agreements that potentially affect highly sensitive 
areas of domestic policy such as the Australian health system.
Consumers
From an economic perspective the sole objective of trade 
negotiations is to increase net national welfare. This essentially 
consumer-based measure aggregates wins and losses over 
the whole of a trade deal. It is widely recognised that the major 
benefit to consumers from free trade is lower prices due to 
reduced tariffs (Armstrong 2012). Consumers also benefit from 
reduced non-tariff barriers, as these can improve the range of 
products available domestically, for example cheeses made 
from unpasteurised milk. 
At the same time improving access by foreign firms to Australia’s 
service markets can involve substantial changes to domestic 
regulations. To take the example of health, improving access 
for overseas firms could mean changing arrangements for 
blood donation, removing or qualifying the Australian Medical 
Association’s role in approving the licensing of doctors trained 
overseas, and allowing a range of new practices in the delivery 
of health services. In the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
negotiations, for example, one of our major trading partners is 
attempting to make arrangements such as the Pharmaceutical 
Benefits Scheme unlawful except in the USA (Gleeson et al. 
2013). 
From a consumer perspective one of the most concerning of 
the non-trade issues is intellectual property rights (IPRs). Most 
IPRs involve government intervention in markets to suppress 
competition – the antithesis of free trade principles. The 
IPR demands of the USA and the EU call for “stronger” IPR 
provisions. What this actually means is IPR provisions which tilt 
the playing field further and further in the interests of a small 
number of major corporations, without providing any improved 
benefit for Australia’s inventors, innovators and creators. Such 
changes also act against consumer interests. Importantly, the 
consumers in this context are not only final consumers but also 
the many firms buying a wide range of input goods to generate 
their final products. It has long been established that such 
systems are not in the interests of a country such as Australia 
– or indeed of the world as a whole (Deardoff 1992; Penrose 
1951). 
At present consumers are rarely consulted about the content 
of trade treaties. An exception is the current TPP negotiations 
where there has been substantial protest by a range of civil 
society groups. The resulting ‘consultations’ have been of very 
poor quality – mere form not substance. There is no public debate 
of the issues, and no evidence that any of the concerns have 
been taken on board. The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
‘consultations’ demonstrated a similar lack of willingness to 
address consumer and intermediary concerns (Moir 2015). 
State Governments 
The trend for ambitious, broad-ranging economic integration 
agreements is likely to continue. As trade deals protrude further 
behind borders, governments increasingly sign deals which 
impact on sub-national governments. Australia is no exception. 
Trade agreements have implications for Australian states and 
territories, and the peculiarities of the federation impact on – 
even constrain – Australia’s international commitments. As 
agreements accumulate diverse chapters covering issues such 
as services, competition policy and education cooperation, 
we can reasonably expect substantive implications for the 
federation. Particularly where trade policy commitments overlap 
with contested policy competences, there is scope for federal 
strife. 
The involvement of states and territories in trade policy is not 
1.Consisting of representatives from the Premier’s or Chief Minister’s Departments 
in each state or territory, and chaired by the Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet.
Australia grows. The forthcoming Reform of the Federation White 
Paper has the stated objective of supporting Australia’s economic 
growth and international competitiveness (Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, 2014). It is an opportunity to ensure 
that our (sometimes informal) institutions are fit for purpose when 
it comes to complex trade deals. 
Broad consultation on complex and sensitive international 
economic integration agreements will be hard. The implications 
of failing to consult – with business, consumers, civil society and 
within the federation – will be worse. The process we propose 
would identify the greatest areas of need for trade liberalisation: 
both in our trading partners, and domestically. Without such a 
process it is difficult to see how Australia can maximise its position 
in an increasingly complex world. 
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And unless current practice is revised, states and territories will 
find themselves implementing trade deals about which they 
were only superficially consulted. 
Consulting widely on live economic integration negotiations 
presents challenges. Fitzgerald (2015) recently referred to 
the notion as ‘functionally impossible’. Yet there is nothing to 
preclude an improved system in which Australia pro-actively 
identifies both demands and concessions, and weighs the 
social and economic implications. 
An improved system must begin by developing a domestic 
agenda setting out clear priorities for reform. This would 
involve consultations across the economy – both exporters 
and non-exporters – and with consumers, other segments of 
civil society and their representative organisations. As three of 
Australia’s leading economic commentators have noted, here 
the world could usefully learn from Australia’s experience with 
the Productivity Commission and its predecessors (Thirwell et 
al. 2009). 
A body such as the Commission, or one with a similar mandate 
and approach, could manage an effective consultation and 
agenda-setting process. The Commission’s tradition of working 
to a statutory mandate of improving the national interest involves 
careful consultation across many interest groups combined 
with evidence-based analysis. This highly credible approach 
ensures that those who have been consulted are aware of what 
suggestions have been taken on board and why others have 
been rejected. The process of issuing an options paper and a 
draft report allows for substantial input from all segments of the 
community
The objective of the national economic reform agenda would 
be to identify all areas where Australian activity is limited either 
by the peculiarities of overseas markets, by high input costs 
or by other poor regulations. The goal would be to maximise 
improvement in net national welfare. Such a consultation and 
evidenced based process would ensure that positions adopted 
during specific preferential trade negotiations are debated and 
more widely understood throughout the community. 
The exercise should be repeated at regular intervals, 
commencing with a thorough review of lessons from previous 
trade negotiations – both successes and missed opportunities – 
and adoption of learning from this. 
This domestic agenda-setting process would provide far better 
guidance than is currently available to trade negotiators on what 
outcomes would best suit our national interest. It would allow 
for full consultation with all stakeholder groups and thorough 
and dispassionate national interest analysis. The current ad hoc 
processes lead to substantial discontent, particularly among 
non-exporter groups who are largely outside current consultative 
arrangements. The domestic agenda-setting process would 
allow for more thorny issues to be thrashed out domestically 
well before any trade negotiations. 
By separating the consultation and priority-setting process from 
specific negotiations, placing it in the hands of an independent 
institution, a genuine debate on what constitutes the national 
interest can take place. If necessary such a process could run in 
parallel – and inform – trade negotiations, without being hostage 
to the negotiating dynamic of a particular agreement.     
At the same time the Australian Government would be wise to 
take a close look at consultation and cooperation mechanisms 
within the federation. As trade policy impinges further on 
sub-national governments, the need for coordination across 
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